Introduction to \u3ci\u3eJ.S.G. Boggs v. Eljay Bowron\u3c/i\u3e et. al. by Yalowitz, Kent A.
Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 4 | Issue 1 Article 2
1995
Introduction to J.S.G. Boggs v. Eljay Bowron et. al.
Kent A. Yalowitz
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Kent A. Yalowitz, Introduction to J.S.G. Boggs v. Eljay Bowron et. al., 4 J. L. & Pol'y (1995).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol4/iss1/2
INTRODUCTION TO
J.S.G. BOGGS v. ELJAY BOWRON, et al.
Kent A. alowitz*
This brief was filed in June, 1995, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, on behalf of J.S.G.
Boggs, the internationally acclaimed visual and performance artist
whose principal metier involves the image of money, often life-size
and in color. Boggs' work captures and represents ideas about
beauty, value, trust and art in daily life. By conducting transactions
with his work-say, a $100.00 "Boggs Bill" in exchange for $95.00
worth of merchandise and $5.00 in change-he has brought art out
of the museum and into the street, confronting issues of trust,
value, aesthetic beauty and questions about the usefulness and value
of art-all in a dialogue with the viewer, rather than in a mono-
logue directed at the viewer. In proposing a transaction, Boggs
generally asks a series of questions designed to prompt the viewer
into thinking about the meaning and uses of art and money in
everyday life. His art allows him to ask the viewer, directly, what
art should look like, what should be done with it and what it
represents, in a kind of Socratic dialogue familiar to every law
student. Indeed, Boggs has been called a Socratic artist, "endlessly
confounding his everyday interlocutors with the precariousness of
everything they took for granted about both money and art. (Why
accept one kind of drawing and not the other? Why, exactly?)."'
In part, Boggs' work is designed to elucidate the idea that the value
of money-indeed, of all intangible forms of value-should be
consciously accepted on the basis of our trust in each other and in
our social and political institutions.
* Kent A. Yalowitz is an Associate at the firm of Arnold & Porter, New
York City office. Columbia University Law School, J.D.; Yale College, B.A. Mr.
Yalowitz is a member of the New York and District of Columbia bars.
' Lawrence Weschler, Money Changes Everything, THE NEW YORKER, Jan.
18, 1993, at 39.
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Perhaps because of his high media visibility, perhaps because
he does not pretend to curry favor with the government, Boggs has
been the victim of harassment and censorship at the hands of the
United States Secret Service, the law enforcement agency responsi-
ble for the enforcement of the anti-counterfeiting laws. The brief
is in support of our appeal of the denial of injunctive relief that
would prevent further harassment by the Secret Service and forbid
prosecution of Boggs.
The case highlights procedural protections for the freedom of
expression that extend beyond the classic "time, place or manner"
analysis one ordinarily thinks of as the protection offered by the
First Amendment.2 Indeed, it is the procedural protections of the
First Amendment that are the most compelling aspect of the case.
In its treatment of Boggs, the Secret Service has insisted on
freedom from judicial oversight, even though cases interpreting the
First Amendment provide for a very explicit series of procedural
protections for individuals engaged in expressive activity. Thus, law
enforcement officers may not regulate expression through informal
coercion and threats of enforcement; they may not regulate
expression without supervision by an independent judicial officer;
they may not seize expressive materials without a warrant; they
may not make wholesale pretrial seizures of expressive materials;
and they may not simply "confiscate" expressive materials with no
post-seizure hearing. Yet that is what they have done to Boggs.
They have silenced Boggs not with criminal prosecution, not with
civil forfeiture, but through raw intimidation and unilateral seizure.
In addition, the First Amendment has long been understood to
forbid the application of criminal sanction without some element of
scienter on the part of the defendant. Strict liability punishment by
the government has the collateral effect of inhibiting the freedom
of expression. The rule has been applied to a wide array of
government regulations of speech beyond the criminal law. Thus,
under New York imes v Sullivan,3 the civil law of libel may not
2 Of course, those kinds of issues are also present in this case. We have
presented evidence that the statute is not a reasonable restriction on speech and
that it has been abused by the government as a content-based restriction on
Boggs' speech.
3 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
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be applied to a defendant unless that defendant has "reckless
disregard" for the truth. The same is true of the civil law of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. In this case, however,
the Secret Service has sought to impose a felony counterfeiting
statute on a person with no scienter. In contrast, one will notice the
brief reference to an informal survey we conducted of popular
magazines. We found that dozens of images of money had been
produced not in compliance with the law as interpreted by the
Secret Service. Indeed, more than eighty-five million copies of
these "violations" were published in one six-month period. This
conflict is hardly justified by "settled expectations that the contents
of magazines and film are generally [not] subject to stringent public
regulation."4
The cases articulating these First Amendment principles have
generally involved pornographers or others at the margins of
mainstream society-precisely those who most need and can most
benefit from simple, broadly understood and uniformly applied
procedural protections. Large, sophisticated publishing houses
surely benefit from the First Amendment's procedural protections,
and as our society emerges into the twenty-first century, the
freedoms afforded by the First Amendment to institutions will
become ever more important. But the soap-box speaker needs First
Amendment procedural protections as well-even more so, because
the soap-box speaker cannot hire counsel to evaluate and enforce
those rights.
The creation of express procedural protections for the exercise
of particular rights has analogies in other areas of constitutional
law, even beyond the rights of the criminally accused (which are
principally procedural rather than substantive protections). For
example, in the wake of Planned Parenthood v Casey,5 the
battleground for protection of abortion rights will involve evalu-
ation of procedural obstacles and protections for women. To take
another example, minimum procedural rights would appear to be a
natural element of the rights of the homeless under the Privileges
4 United States v. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. 464, 468-69 (1994).
114 S. Ct. 909 (1994).
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and Immunities Clause:6 there too, individuals at society's margins
have long been subject to ex parte harassment at the hands of
police officers. And while the anti-loitering laws have long been
held unconstitutionally vague as a matter of substance, the
harassment continues. Specific procedural protections, rooted in
particular guarantees of the Constitution, could provide powerful
tools for the protection of these individuals with a more concrete
grounding than the "liberty" interest protected by the Due Process
Clause.7
In the end, of course, each case is decided on its own merits,
and not on what it might lead to. Nonetheless, the Boggs case
reminds us of the potential of the procedural protections of the First
Amendment.
6 "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7 These freedoms also benefit from a scienter rule, as well-much in the
same way that freedom of expression is protected by this bulwark-even though
it is accepted that the Due Process Clause does not require a scienter element in
every crime.
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ELJAY BOWRON, et aL,
Appellees.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
In this First Amendment case, the District Court's jurisdiction
rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. On December 9, 1993, the District
Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment and
denied Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. (App. 24.)
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On December 14, 1993, Plaintiff served a motion for correction of
error (App. 263-67) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a), thereby
tolling his time to appeal, Fed. R. App. P 4(a). On March 28,
1995, the District Court granted that motion and directed the entry
of final judgment as to the First Claim for Relief pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b). (App. 268-69.) Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal
on April 11, 1995. This Court's jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1291 and 1292(a).
ISSUES PRESENTED
The District Court declined to issue an injunction protecting
Plaintiff J.S.G. Boggs ("Boggs") from harassment by the Secret
Service and held that even though Boggs has no intent to defraud
anyone he may be prosecuted under clauses 5 and 6 of 18 U.S.C.
§ 474 (a counterfeiting felony) for having created this and other
like pieces of art:
0 J.S.G. Boggs 1993
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For that ruling to stand, this Court must answer each of the
following questions in the affirmative:
1. May the Government regulate Boggs' speech by informal
threats of prosecution and seizure en masse of his property without
any forfeiture hearing?
2. Are the principles that scienter is a necessary element for
conviction of any felony and that a statute must be interpreted to
avoid serious First Amendment concerns inapplicable to 18 U.S.C.
§ 474?
3. Would prosecution of Boggs under section 474 be consistent
with the First Amendment?
4. Would a jury drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of
Boggs and conscientiously following instructions requiring proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt be justified in concluding that this
piece and the other works of art in the record meet the traditional
"similitude" test required for conviction in counterfeiting prosecu-
tions?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES
1. The First Amendment provides in part:
Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press ....
2. 18 U.S.C. § 474(a) (Supp. V 1993) provides in part:
§ 474. Plates or stones for counterfeiting obliga-
tions or securities
(a) ****
[5] Whoever has in his possession or custody, except
under authority from the Secretary of the Treasury or
other proper officer, any obligation or other security
made or executed, in whole or in part, after the
similitude of any obligation or other security issued
under the authority of the United States, with intent to
sell or otherwise use the same; or
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
[6] Whoever prints, photographs, or in any other
manner makes or executes any engraving, photograph,
print, or impression in the likeness of any such obliga-
tion or other security, or any part thereof, or sells any
such engraving, photograph, print, or impression,
except to the United States, or brings into the United
States, any such engraving, photograph, print, or
impression, except by direction of some proper officer
of the United States-
Is guilty of a class C felony.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. V 1993) provides in part:
§ 504. Printing and filming of United States and
foreign obligations and securities
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter,
the following are permitted:
(1) the printing, publishing, or importation, or the
making or importation of the necessary plates for such
printing or publishing, of illustrations of-
(A) postage stamps of the United States,
(B) revenue stamps of the United States,
(C) any other obligation or other security of the
United States, and
(D) postage stamps, revenue stamps, notes, bonds,
and any other obligation or other security of any
foreign government, bank, or corporation.
Illustrations permitted by the foregoing provisions of this
section shall be made in accordance with the following
conditions-
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(i) all illustrations shall be in black and white... ;
(ii) all illustrations ... shall be of a size less than
three-fourths or more than one and one-half, in linear
dimension, of each part of any matter so illustrated
which is covered by subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D)
of this paragraph. . .; and
(iii) the negatives and plates used in making the
illustrations shall be destroyed after their final use in
accordance with this section.
The Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe regula-
tions to permit color illustrations of such currency of
the United States as the Secretary determines may be
appropriate for such purposes.
STATEMENT
The Nature Of The Case And The District Court's Disposition
The Complaint seeks (1) declaratory and injunctive relief
forbidding the Government to harass Plaintiff J.S.G. Boggs or to
prosecute him in violation of his First Amendment rights, and (2)
the return of property seized by the Secret Service and damages for
the destruction of property. (App. 10-20.) The District Court
denied Boggs' motion for a preliminary injunction; granted
Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the claim
for declaratory and injunctive relief; certified the dismissal of that
claim as final under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); and held the claim for
return of property and damages in abeyance pending resolution of
this appeal. (App. 24, 268-69.)
Statement Of Facts
The Artist. J.S.G. Boggs is an internationally recognized artist.
His work has been exhibited throughout America and Europe, and
he has been the subject of articles in numerous publications, a
documentary film called Money Man by Philip Haas, and stories
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carried by every major television network. He received formal
training in fine arts at Columbia University; served as a Fellow in
Art and Ethics at Carnegie Mellon University; lectured at Brown
University; and has published scholarly work. See Mem. Op. 2 &
n.6 (App. 26), 842 F. Supp. at 544; Boggs Aff. 1-2; Mayer
Decl. 4 (App. 110-11, 178); J.S.G. Boggs, Who Owns This?, 68
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 889 (1993).
Boggs uses images of money in his work, which offers a rich
commentary on social, political, and philosophical issues and is
rooted in a strong historical tradition. Chambers Decl. TT 5-12;
Mayer Decl. TT 5-6 (App. 171-76, 178-79). He began creating in
this style inadvertently. In May 1984, while attending an art expo
in Chicago, Boggs occupied himself in a diner by sketching the
numeral one and developing it into a dollar bill; his waitress
noticed it and asked to buy it from him. They negotiated a
transaction in which she accepted the art as payment for his
doughnut and coffee, which cost 90 cents. The waitress insisted on
giving Boggs a dime in change, which he framed; the dime serves
as a symbol of the transaction, which captured and represented
ideas about beauty, value, trust, and art. Boggs Aff. 6 (App. 113);
see Mem. Op. 3 n.9 (App. 27), 842 F. Supp. at 544.
This transaction and others like it have allowed Boggs to make
his work accessible to ordinary people. In proposing a transaction,
Boggs offers to exchange a work of art, often the same size as
currency but generally one-sided, for goods or services. The
proposal leads to a dialogue about the meaning and uses of art and
money in everyday life. The viewer grapples with questions about
what art should look like, what should be done with it, and what
it represents. Sometimes the art is accepted in exchange for goods
or services, sometimes not. Boggs Aff. TT 7-8; Mayer Decl. TT 6-7
(App. 113-14, 179-80).
Boggs' art is his medium and his message. Size and color
profoundly affect that message: grossly oversized bills or comically
small "mini-money" would communicate an entirely different set
of ideas; they are not an alternative means to communicate the
same ideas. Boggs Aff. 9; Chambers Decl. 12; Mayer Decl. 8
(App. 114-15, 175-76, 180). This is not to say that Boggs demands
some sort of First Amendment right as an artist to create counter-
feit money--quite the contrary. Boggs recognizes that there are
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limits to what he can create without risking the possibility that
someone might be deceived with his work; he does not and will not
cross those limits. Verified Complaint 6; Boggs Aff. 3; Motions
Hearing Tr. 59; Boggs Decl. 7; see Bittman Decl. 3 (App. 12,
111-12, 247, 258-60). As the art reproduced above at page 2 and
in the record demonstrates, Boggs' work does not have the "look"
and "feel" of money. It does not resemble money in its details. It
is not calculated to deceive and defraud; it is calculated to
illuminate.
Boggs does not defraud anyone. People who accept his work do
so with full knowledge that it is not genuine currency-and not
only because of Boggs' representations. Boggs' work has never
been-and cannot be--"passed off' as genuine to a person of
ordinary observation. Indeed, over the years, Boggs has created and
bartered thousands of works of art around the world. There is no
evidence in the record of a single person who has complained to
any law-enforce-ment authority about being defrauded by Boggs or
anyone else using his art. We repeatedly challenged the Defendants
to produce such evidence in the District Court. They could not.
Censored By Federal Agents. Secret Service agents have
repeatedly harassed Boggs because they do not like the subject
matter of his work. While many publishers and advertisers large
and small use images of money (see Addendum A at l a-4a), the
Secret Service has singled out Boggs, repeatedly censoring him,
confiscating his art, and threatening to imprison him.
In September 1990, Secret Service agents in Florida censored
a catalog entitled smart money (HARD CURRENCY), which was to
accompany an exhibition of Boggs' work. Boggs originally
designed the catalog to present reproductions of his work in its
actual dimensions and colors. Secret Service agents told the printer
that he had already violated the counterfeiting laws by creating
color separations for the catalog and that printing the catalog as
designed would be a further crime. Naturally, the printer refused to
print the catalog in the face of this advice. With the exhibition
scheduled to begin in short order, Boggs was forced to redesign the
content of the catalog to comport with the Secret Service's views
of what did or did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 474 and its companion,
18 U.S.C. § 504. Verified Complaint 9-10; Boggs Decl. 2;
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Bittman Decl. 1 5-7 (App. 13-14, 254-55, 260-61). The United
States Attorney declined prosecution.
In March 1991, while Boggs was in Cheyenne, Wyoming for
the opening in that city of the smart money (HARD CURRENCY)
exhibition, Secret Service Agent Jerry Hanson, accompanied by the
United States Attorney for the District of Wyoming, Richard
Stacey, appeared at Boggs' hotel-room door and demanded that
Boggs hand over his entire inventory of art. Boggs insisted that
only a single example of each type of work be seized. After several
hours of tense negotiation, during which it appeared to Boggs that
he would face arrest and prosecution for the content of his art, the
United States Attorney agreed to take only fifteen specimens and
told Boggs that they would be sent to Washington, D.C., for a
"determination" of whether the work was "contraband." Despite
repeated demands, the Secret Service has refused to return the art
or seek a hearing approving its seizure. Verified Complaint 11-
12 (App. 14-15). Again, the United States Attorney declined
prosecution.
Then, in December 1992, Secret Service agents in Pennsylvania
seized more than 1300 items of personal property including dozens
of drawings from his home and faculty office. They destroyed
valuable pieces of art during their search. They "accidentally"
broke Boggs' eyeglasses by picking them up, dropping them on the
floor, and stepping on them. It was, for Boggs, a humiliating
experience. Because of the Government agents' arrogance and
brazenness, Boggs felt even more violated than he had when his
home and studio had been burglarized by common thieves. Verified
Complaint T 13; Boggs Decl. 11 4-6 (App. 15, 256-57).
Since December 1992, Boggs' work has been severely ham-
pered by the Secret Service's supposed "ongoing investigation."
Secret Service agents have told Boggs that his work is "illegal" and
have questioned people who have bought it. Boggs Aff. 15-16;
Abraham Decl. 4 (App. 116-17, 187-88). As a result, many
people who used to exchange Boggs' work for goods or services
will no longer do so. Boggs Aff. 11 15-16 (App. 116-17). The
specter of criminal liability caused the artists' cooperative where
Boggs lived and worked to stop accepting his work in exchange for
his use of the space. Id. And fear of the Secret Service has caused
gallery owners who would like to show and sell Boggs' work to
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refrain from doing so. Boggs Aff. 15-16; Berkovitz Decl. IT 2-3
(App. 116-17, 119-20).
Defendants have thus far refused to present any case against
Boggs to a judge and jury, preferring instead to rely exclusively on
extrajudicial threats and ex parte seizures. Although the United
States Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania wrote to
Boggs asserting that he had violated clauses 5 and 6 of 18 U.S.C.
§ 474 (S.J. Hearing Ex. 2 (App. 252-53)), he, too, has declined
prosecution. And the United States Attorney in Washington, D.C.
has advised us that the Defendants do not intend to file a forfeiture
action, "but will merely keep" Boggs' art as "contraband."
The District Court Decision. Fearing imminent prosecution,
unable to sell his work freely, and having exhausted all efforts to
resolve the matter without the need for judicial intervention
(Yalowitz Certif. TT 4-5 & Exs. A & B (App. 85-86, 89-100)),
Boggs commenced this action on September 3, 1993, seeking a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction against the
Director of the Secret Service, the Secretary of the Treasury, and
the Attorney General.
On December 9, 1993, the District Court granted Defendants'
motion for summary judgment, dismissed the First Claim (for
declaratory and injunctive relief), and denied Boggs' motion for a
preliminary injunction as "moot." The basis of this mootness
ruling was merely that the claim had been dismissed on the
merits-not that anything had rendered the case moot in the
traditional Article III sense. Indeed, the District Court found that
Boggs has a well-founded fear of prosecution and that he
is being injured by the Secret Service in a number of ways
other than threat of prosecution. Not only has the Secret
Service seized his work, but also Mr. Boggs finds himself
unable to sell his art. Fear of Secret Service seizure has
also caused the artists' cooperative where Boggs lives to
stop accepting his work. Boggs Aff. 15. Collectors and
gallery owners who would like to show or buy Boggs'
work are also fearful of Secret Service intervention. See
Sam Berkovitz Aff.
Mem. Op. 13-14 (App. 37-38), 842 F. Supp. at 548. Inexplicably,
however, the District Court failed to rule on Boggs' request for an
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injunction forbidding the harassment causing these injuries, thereby
denying it sub silentio.
In declining to enjoin prosecution, the District Court rejected
the Government's contention that the Court was powerless to act,
holding-on the strength of well-settled Supreme Court authority-
that Boggs "'should not be required to await and undergo a
criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief"' to protect
his First Amendment rights. Mem. Op. 10 (App. 34), 842 E Supp.
at 547 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973), and
citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974)).
The District Court also found that "[n]o one seriously suggests
that Mr. Boggs has any intent to defraud," so that "if intent to
defraud is statutorily required, no jury could find that the statute
applies to Boggs." Mem. Op. 35 (App. 59), 842 F. Supp. at 557.
But the District Court held that "[ijf Congress intended an intent to
defraud or an intent to pass as genuine standard it would have said
so explicitly." Mem. Op. 39 (App. 63), 842 F. Supp. at 559
(internal quotations and emphasis omitted). In holding that section
474 is a strict-liability felony, the District Court did not point to
any "affirmative instruction" by Congress to this effect, as is
required by Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 273 (1952),
and did not acknowledge two important principles: that the First
Amendment forbids strict-liability crimes infringing on speech; and
that, where possible, statutes must be construed to avoid deciding
constitutional questions. Instead, the District Court conducted a
time-place-and-manner constitutional analysis of the size and color
limitations set out in 18 U.S.C. § 504 and upheld their facial
validity on the strength of a concurring opinion in Regan v. ime,
Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 704 (1984). Mem. Op. 31-33 (App. 55-57), 842
E Supp. at 556.
Finally, the District Court found that "a jury would be justified,
if not compelled, to find that [the works of art presented to the
Court] were in the likeness and similitude of genuine United States
currency." Mem. Op. 44 (App. 68), 842 F. Supp. at 561.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Whether or not we are correct that the counterfeiting statutes
may not be applied to Boggs, the Secret Service may not proceed
by fiat and intimidation. The First Amendment requires that it
proceed in court. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46
(1989); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). The
Secret Service has seized Boggs' work en masse and eschewed
judicial review of this prior restraint. It has also intimidated his
customers, printers, and prospective art dealers. An injunction
forbidding this behavior is warranted.
2. An injunction forbidding prosecution is warranted as well,
for three reasons, any one of which is sufficient:
a. Boggs may not be prosecuted because he does not have an
intent to defraud. Since the earliest days of our Nation's history, it
has been a precept of the criminal law that the legislature intends
to include the scienter element required at common law in all
felonies, even where the words of the statute itself do not do so.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). In counterfeiting
and forgery statutes, this requires an intent to defraud. E.g., United
States v. Hester, 598 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The statute in-
voked by the Government in this case, 18 U.S.C. § 474, is no
exception. Although the District Court acknowledged Morissette
and found that Boggs possesses no intent to defraud, it concluded
that Congress intended to exempt section 474 because Congress
"knew how" to include a scienter element expressly and did not do
so here. This "dog that did not bark in the night" analysis is
contrary to well-settled Supreme Court authority. It is also contrary
to the legislative history of this Civil War-era counterfeiting statute,
which the District Court did not examine.
Although the District Court's failure to follow Morissette would
alone be sufficient to require reversal, the District Court failed to
grapple with-indeed failed even to acknowledge-the rule that,
where possible, statutes must be construed to avoid questions as to
their constitutionality. This rule, which applies with special force
in the First Amendment context, also requires an interpretation of
the statute to include a scienter element; without this narrowing
interpretation, this Court will be faced with an unconstitutional
statute.
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b. Prosecution of Boggs under this statute would be unconstitu-
tional (again for three independently sufficient reasons). First,
without some scienter element, the statute would run afoul of the
First Amendment's prohibition on strict-liability crimes that burden
speech. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). Second, the
statutory scheme (which includes a safe-harbor exemption from
liability for illustrations of currency meeting the size and color
limitations of section 504) is not "narrowly tailored" to further a
legitimate government interest. Ten years ago, a plurality of the
Supreme Court held that sections 474 and 504 served to keep color
separations of images of money out of the hands of would-be
counterfeiters. Today, there is no longer a "real nexus" between this
governmental interest and the restriction on speech; because of
widely available computer technology, the size and color restric-
tions no longer serve the goal they were designed for. Third, the
size and color limitations have been abused by the Secret Service
as an unconstitutional, content-based restriction on Boggs' speech.
c. The works of art in the record do not meet the similitude test
required for conviction of a counterfeiting felony. Mem. Op. 45
(App. 69), 842 F. Supp. at 561. This, too, stands as an independent
ground for reversal: the evidence cannot be squared with the
District Court's assertion (in granting the Government summary
judgment) that a reasonable jury, conscientiously following
instructions requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, would be
"justified, if not compelled" to find that the works of art in the
record are so similar to genuine currency that they are "calculated
to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary
observation."
ARGUMENT
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this
Court examines the record de novo, drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the appellant. Sherwood v. Washington Post,
871 F.2d 1144, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam). "Furthermore,
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in cases which implicate first amendment issues, an appellate court
has an obligation to make an independent examination of the whole
record." Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Rees, 852 F.2d 595, 598 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
284-86 (1964) (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1010 (1989). Finally, the Court "must view the evidence
presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986). The
District Court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Boggs'
claim for an injunction against criminal prosecution, therefore,
cannot stand unless the evidence in the record, viewed in the light
most favorable to Boggs, would support a finding of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt as to each of the essential elements of the crime.
Cf Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-20 (1979) (articulating
standard for post-conviction collateral attack).
II. HARASSMENT OF BOGGS SHOULD BE ENJOINED
Whether or not we are correct that the counterfeiting statutes
may not be enforced against Boggs, the Secret Service may not
install itself as a modern-day Star Chamber, acting as prosecutor,
judge, jury, and sheriff to suppress expression. But that is what it
has done. As the District Court found, Secret Service agents have
injured Boggs by questioning his customers, intimidating his
printers, and scaring off.his art dealers. Mem. Op. 13-14 (App. 37-
38), 842 F. Supp. at 548 (quoted supra p. 11); see Boggs Aff.
15-16; Berkovitz Decl. 3; Abraham Decl. 4; Bittman Decl.
5-7 (App. 116-17, 119-20, 187-88, 260-61). That kind of
extrajudicial censorship violates the First Amendment. In Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), the Supreme Court
forbade the use of informal threats of legal sanction, saying:
People do not lightly disregard public officers' thinly
veiled threats to institute criminal proceedings against them
if they do not come around ....
In thus obviating the need to employ criminal sanctions,
the State has at the same time eliminated the safeguards of
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the criminal process. . . . It is a form of regulation that
creates hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater
than those that attend reliance upon the criminal law.
372 U.S. at 68-70; accord PHE, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 743
F. Supp. 15, 21-23 (D.D.C. 1990) (granting injunction on strength
of Bantam Books); Playboy Enterprises v. Meese, 639 E Supp.
581, 585 (D.D.C. 1986) (same); UT Inc. v. Brown, 457 F. Supp.
163, 168-69 (WD.N.C. 1978) (ordinance void under Bantam
Books). Inexplicably, the District Court never addressed the
application of Bantam Books to this case even though it specifically
requested briefing on the issue. (TRO Hearing Tr. 27-28, App. 147-
48.)
In addition, Defendants seized Boggs' works en masse and have
steadfastly resisted any hearing of any kind, insisting that they may
"merely keep" the art he created. See supra p. 10. That, too, is
forbidden by the First Amendment: "large-scale seizure of books or
films constituting a 'prior restraint' must be preceded by an
adversary hearing," and "even where a seizure ... would merely
preserve evidence for trial, ... there must be an opportunity for a
prompt postseizure judicial determination." New York v. PJ.
Video, 475 U.S. 868, 873 (1986) (explaining Heller v. New York,
413 U.S. 483 (1973), A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205
(1964), and Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717 (1961));
accord Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 63 (1989)
("[U]ntil there was a 'judicial determination of the obscenity issue
in an adversary proceeding,' exhibition of a film could not be
restrained by seizing all the available copies of it. The same is ob-
viously true for books or any other expressive materials." (quoting
Heller, 413 U.S. at 492-93 (1973))); Vance v. Universal Amuse-
ment Co., 445 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1980); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S.
410, 418 (1971). This line of cases stems from the Court's
disapproval of "[t]he use by government of the power of search and
seizure as an adjunct to a system for the suppression of objection-
able publications." Marcus, 367 U.S. at 724; accord Fort Wayne
Books, 489 U.S. at 63-64.
Our Constitution does not leave freedom of expression to the
grace of government clerks and faceless bureaucrats; its Framers
instead entrusted the fates of those the Government would silence
to the common sense of juries tempered by the wisdom of judges.
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Defendants' apparent unwillingness to abide by these rules speaks
volumes.
Although the District Court quite clearly found that Boggs was
suffering injury because of these wrongful acts (see supra p. 11),
it did not issue an injunction against them and did not say why it
was not doing so. This alone warrants reversal.
III. PROSECUTION OF BOGGS SHOULD BE ENJOINED
There are three independent reasons-each alone sufficient for
reversal-why Boggs cannot be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 474.
First, Boggs does not have the intent to defraud that the statute
must be read to require as an element of the crime. (Point III(A),
below.) Second, prosecution of Boggs under this statute would
violate the First Amendment. (Point III(B), below.) And third, the
Government cannot satisfy the traditional similitude test required
for conviction under the counterfeiting laws. (Point III(C), below.)
If the Court agrees with us on any one of these points, it should
direct the prompt entry of an injunction forbidding prosecution of
Boggs. Where, as here, First Amendment rights are jeopardized,
declaratory and injunctive relief-including preliminary injunctive
relief-are fully warranted. ' Boggs' well-founded fear of prosecu-
tion is a sufficient basis for such a remedy: he need not show
prosecutorial bad faith. Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432 (1975).
The loss of First Amendment freedoms for any period of time
constitutes the required irreparable injury. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 373 (1976).
In the District Court, Defendants contended that the separation-
of-powers doctrine "compels judicial non-intervention." The
argument that the federal courts lack authority to enjoin criminal
prosecutions that threaten constitutional rights has been raised and
' See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 712 (1977); Doran v, Salem Inn,
Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975); Quaker Action Group v. Hickel, 421 F.2d 1111,
1116 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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rejected time and time again.' It did not detain the District Court
from passing on the merits and need not detain this Court either.
A. 18 U.S.C. § 474 Requires An Intent To Defraud For
Conviction
The District Court's finding that "[n]o one seriously suggests
that Mr. Boggs has any intent to defraud" (Mem. Op. 35 (App. 59),
842 E Supp. at 557) is dispositive of whether Boggs can be
prosecuted for a federal counterfeiting felony. The statute must be
interpreted to include the scienter required at common law-here,
an intent to defraud.
1. Scienter is the Rule, Not the Exception
As Chief Justice Burger explained for the Court in United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., "'[t]he existence of a mens rea
is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-
American criminal jurisprudence."' 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978)
(quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951)).
Justice Jackson's eloquent and enduring expression of this principle
for the Court in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952),
remains the touchstone for the rule requiring some "affirmative
instruction from Congress to eliminate intent from any offense."
342 U.S. at 273. The mens rea requirement
is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and
persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of
the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the
normal individual to choose between good and evil
2 E.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992);
Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988); Babbitt v.
United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298-99 (1979); Wooley, 430
U.S. at 709-12; Doran, 422 U.S. at 926-28; Ellis, 421 U.S. at 432; Dombrowski
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 483-92 (1965); Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 163-66
(1908).
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The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the
requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's
path to conviction, to strip the defendant of such benefit as
he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose,
and to circumscribe the freedom heretofore allowed juries.
Such a manifest impairment of the immunities of the
individual should not be extended to common-law crimes
on judicial initiative.
Id. at 250, 263.
Again and again, this rule "has been 'followed in regard to
statutory crimes even where the statutory definition did not in terms
include it."' Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1797 (1994)
(quoting United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1922)).'
Only this Term, the Supreme Court rejected "the most natural
grammatical reading" of a federal statute in favor of the presump-
tion that "some form of scienter is to be implied in a criminal
statute even if not expressed." United States v. X-Citement Video,
Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464, 467-68 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.).
To be sure, a prosecutor's job would be easier without a
scienter requirement. But in the ordinary criminal case, prosecutors
have little trouble proving scienter because a jury may infer
criminal intent from the facts and circumstances of the case. The
scienter rule therefore offers only slight protection for the guilty,
but important shelter for the rare individual pursued by an overly
zealous or misguided prosecutor in a case where ordinary citizens
might not expect to be subject to the moral condemnation of the
community.4 Some familiar cases have turned on this principle.
See, e.g., United States v. D'Amato, 39 E3d 1249 (2d Cir. 1994);
' E.g., Posters 'N' Things, Ltd v. UnitedStates, 114 S. Ct. 1747, 1752-54
(1994); Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 351 n.* (1991); Liparota v.
United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985); United States Gypsum, 438 U.S. at
437-38; United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 258, 261-62 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam: Silberman and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, JJ., and Thomas, Circuit Justice,
on the panel), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 362 (1992); United States v. Burke, 888
F.2d 862, 866-67 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442,
452-53 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1003 (1989).
4 X-Citement, 115 S. Ct. at 468; Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1799-1802; Liparota,
471 U.S. at 426.
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United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1003 (1989). Federal prosecutors--on whom the courts
rely to exercise conscience and circumspection-have three times
declined to prosecute Boggs. But the Secret Service appears
determined to keep looking for one who will.
2. Counterfeiting Statutes Require An Intent To Defraud
In deciding the level of scienter required for each element of a
crime, the Court must determine "what level of intent Congress
intended the Government to prove, taking into account constitution-
al considerations, as well as the common-law background, if any,
of the crime involved." United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 613-
14 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted). The level
of scienter required for conviction is generally the one imposed at
common law for similar crimes because Congress is presumed to
borrow the "cluster of ideas" that attached to such crimes at
common law. See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 351 n.*
(1991); Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263; United States v. Carll, 105
U.S. 611, 612-13 (1881); Levine v. United States, 261 F.2d 747,
750 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
The courts have therefore interpreted statutes aimed at counter-
feiting, forgery, and fraud to carry an intent-to-defraud requirement
where the statutes themselves contain an incomplete intent element
or none at all. The most familiar example is 18 U.S.C. § 495,
which prohibits false making, alteration, forgery, and counterfeiting
"for the purpose of obtaining" money from the United States in
certain cases. The cases hold that conviction under any clause
requires a fraudulent state of mind, even though only two of the
three clauses expressly require an intent to defraud.5 In United
States v. Hester, 598 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1979), this Court
' See, e.g., United States v. Bates, 468 F.2d 1252, 1255 (5th Cir. 1972);
UnitedStates v. Sonnenberg, 158 F.2d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1946); Staton v. United
States, 88 F. 253, 255 (8th Cir. 1898); see also United States v. Price, 795 F.2d
61, 63 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Massey, 629 F.2d 1084, 1086 (5th Cir.
Unit A 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 969 (1981); United States v. White, 611
F.2d 531, 538 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 992 (1980); United States v.
Sullivan, 406 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 1969).
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invalidated the standard "red book" instruction that the Government
need not prove an intent to defraud for conviction under section
495. Observing that some, but not all, of the statutory provisions
"explicitly include 'intent to defraud' as an element," the Court
held that "an individual cannot be convicted of forgery [under the
statute] unless he has 'an intent to defraud."' 598 F.2d at 248 &
n.4.
The closest parallel to section 474 (18 U.S.C. § 481) has also
been interpreted to require intent to defraud, even though it does
not expressly include language to that effect.6 Other statutes
similarly interpreted to require an intent to defraud include 18
U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to defraud the United States)7 and 18
U.S.C. § 505 (signatures of judicial officers).8 At least one court
of appeals has observed that section 474 itself carries a scienter
element,9 and in other cases under section 474, prosecutors have
proceeded on the assumption that the defendant must be charged
with the requisite intent.' ° Although other courts have stated
(without considering Morissette and its progeny) that clause 6 of
section 474 carries no intent requirement, the reported prosecutions
all appear to have involved defendants who had the requisite intent
to defraud.
By 1862, when Congress enacted the original version of section
474 (see infra pp. 30-31), the rules described above were well
established: conviction of a felony required a criminal state of
mind," and conviction of statutory felonies required the state of
6 Levinson v. United States, 47 F.2d 470, 471 (6th Cir. 1931).
7 Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 187-88 (1924).
s United States v. White, 27 F. 200, 203 (E.D. Mo. 1886).
9 Michener v. United States, 157 F.2d 616, 620 (8th Cir. 1946) ("Mere
possession is not made a crime by this statute. That possession would be innocent
were it not possessed with intent to use the plate in counterfeiting."), rev'd on
other grounds, 331 U.S. 789 (1947) (per curiam).
"0 Pawley v. United States, 73 F.2d 907, 907 (9th Cir. 1934) (prosecution
for violation of section 474's predecessor with intent to "use ... in forging and
counterfeiting"); Litkofsky v. United States, 9 F.2d 877, 878 (2d Cir. 1925)
(same).
" See I Joel P. Bishop, Commentaries on the Criminal Law § 225, at 259
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 2d ed. 1858) (Addendum Tab 25); id. § 227, at
260 ("There is only one criterion by which the guilt of men is to be tested. It is
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mind necessary for conviction at common law.2 The federal
statutes aimed at counterfeiting and forgery had already been
interpreted to require a specific intent to defraud. See United States
v. Staats, 49 U.S. (8 Howard) 41, 45 (1850) (noting that intent to
defraud is a required element of forgery); United States v. King, 26
F. Cas. 787, 788 (D. Ohio 1851) (No. 15,535) (Addendum Tab 41);
United States v. Burns, 24 F. Cas. 1313, 1315 (D. Ohio 1849) (No.
14,691) (Addendum Tab 40) ("It is of the essence of the crime
imputed to the defendant, that he made, or assisted in making the
spurious coin, with the fraudulent intent of passing it as genuine.").
The King case involved a magician who used spurious coins in
his act. He was prosecuted for counterfeiting. In instructing the jury
(which acquitted the defendant), the court had this to say:
In this case it is insisted that if the defendant made the
spurious coins, it was not for the purpose of fraudulent
utterance, but to aid him in his performances as a professor
of magic. If the jury shall come to the conclusion, from the
evidence, that this was the defendant's purpose in making
the coins, it is very clear, their verdict must be one of
acquittal.
King, 26 F. Cas. at 788 (Addendum Tab 41).
The state cases appear to have been uniformly in accord with
the federal cases. 3 And these holdings were, in turn, consonant
whether the mind is criminal .... [T]he essence of an offence is the wrongful
intent, without which it cannot exist.") (citing more than two dozen cases); id,
§ 228a, at 262.
12 Id. §§ 80-81, at 117-18 (Addendum Tab 25). So-called regulatory crimes
were embryonic in England during this period and had not yet taken root in the
United States. See generally Morissette, 342 U.S. at 253-55 & n. 12 (describing
genesis of such crimes).
13 See Commonwealth v. Hinds, 101 Mass. 209, 210 (Mass. 1869) (Adden-
dum Tab 32) ("In order to maintain an indictment for forgery at common law,
it must appear not only that there has been a false making of a written
instrument, for the purpose of fraud or deceit, but also that the forged instrument
is of such a description that it might defraud or deceive, if used with that
intent."); Wash v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 530, 533, 540 (Va. 1861)
(Addendum Tab 42); Commonwealth v. Davis, 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 4, 7-8 (Mass.
1858) (Addendum Tab 31); Clarke v. State, 8 Ohio St. 630, 634 (Ohio, Dec.
Term 1858) (Addendum Tab 30); Commonwealth v. Kent, 47 Mass. (6 Met.)
221, 223 (Mass. 1843) (Addendum Tab 33) (prosecution under statute
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with the learned treatises of the day.14 Joel Bishop, one of the
leading criminal-law commentators of the Nineteenth Century,
explained that this principle applied to statutes with no express
mens rea element: without a specific criminal intent, a person
"commits no offence in law, though he does acts completely within
all the words of a statute which prohibits the acts, being silent
concerning the intent." 1 Bishop, supra, § 253, at 289-90 (Adden-
dum Tab 25). For support, Bishop pointed to an English felony
statute that forbade the duplicate use of any paper subject to a
stamp tax, with "no mention whether the intent must be a fraudu-
lent one or otherwise":
Yet it was ruled by Abinger, C.B., that the offence is not
committed unless the intent is fraudulent. The doctrine is,
that the statute is to be so construed in connection with the
common law, which requires an evil intent to accompany
criminalizing possession of counterfeiting tools: "the gist of the offence is the
criminal intent, and therefore the fact of the possession of such an instrument
being proved, the intent was rightly left to the jury"); Commonwealth v.
Woodbury, Thach. Crim. Cas. 47, 49-50 (Boston Mun. Ct. 1824) (Addendum
Tab 35); People v. Gardner, 1 Wheel. Crim. Cas. 23, 25 (N.Y. City Ct. 1822)
(Addendum Tab 36); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 15 Mass. 526, 527 (Mass. 1819)
(Addendum Tab 34) ("The false making, with intent to defraud, is the gist of the
offence" of forgery); State v. Odel, 4 S.C.L. (3 Brev.) *552, *553 (S.C. Const.
Ct. 1816) (Addendum Tab 38) ("it is no offence to pass counterfeit money,
knowing it to be so, unless it is with an intention to defraud"); State v.
Washington, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 120, 152 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pleas 1791) (Addendum
Tab 39) ("The only point on which we agree with the prisoner's counsel, is, that
to make forgery, felony under this act, it must be done with intention to defraud.
It surely must. It is the essence of the crime.") (emphasis by the court); id at
153 ("'The notion of forgery doth not seem so much to consist in the counterfeit-
ing a man's hand, which may often be done innocently, but in the endeavoring
to give an appearance of truth to a mere deceit and falsity .... ') (quoting I
Hawk. P.C. c. 70 s. 2).
" See 2 Bishop, supra, § 491, at 345-46 (Addendum Tab 25) ("In forgery,
as in all other offenses, the act, to be indictable, must proceed from some evil
intention."); 5 Francis Wharton, Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United
States 496 (Philadelphia, James Kay, Jun. & Brother 2d ed. 1852) (Addendum
Tab 26) ("The intention to defraud is an essential to the completion of the
offence . . ").
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the evil act, as to add in favor of the defendant this provi-
sion.
Id.
3. Section 474 Is Subject To The Morissette Presumption
Instead of applying these rules to 18 U.S.C. § 474, the District
Court said that "Congress intended some crimes [within section
474] to carry an intent to defraud requirement and others not, as
evidenced by the differences in classification and punishment set
out in the statute." Mem. Op. 41-42 (App. 65-66), 842 F. Supp.
at 560. In fact, all six clauses of the statute provide for the same
"class C" felony, and all therefore carry the same level of punish-
ment, see infra p. 29 n. 17. Building on that error, the District Court
concluded that clause 6 is a strict-liability crime and that clause 5
requires only an "intent to use" for some pecuniary gain unrelated
to criminal purposes. The District Court did not point to any
"affirmative instruction from Congress" (Morissette, 342 U.S. at
273) supporting this interpretation. Instead, it relied exclusively on
the absence of an express intent-to-defraud element and on three
cases from other jurisdictions. Mem. Op. 38-42 (App. 62-66), 842
F. Supp. at 558-60.
Even taken on its own terms (and leaving aside the constitution-
al issues and the legislative history (see infra pp. 29-43)), the
District Court's analysis does not withstand scrutiny for four
reasons. First, the absence of an express intent element in clause 6
may not be used to demonstrate (as the District Court attempted)
that no intent is required. The law is exactly the contrary. "Certain-
ly far more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase from
the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an
intent requirement." United States Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 438;
accord Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1797-98; Braxton, 500 U.S. at 351
n.*; Morissette, 342 U.S. at 262-63; Burke, 888 E2d at 866. The
Supreme Court and this Court have also rejected the notion
(embraced by the District Court) that the absence of an express
scienter element in some but not all provisions of a statute implies
an intent to omit a scienter requirement. See, e.g., X-Citement, 115
S. Ct. at 468; Hester, 598 E2d at 248-49; cases cited supra p. 22
n. 5.
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Second, none of the cases relied on by the District Court
discusses or even cites Morissette or its progeny. Thus, they are not
only irreconcilable with well-settled Supreme Court precedent, they
are without precedential value on the question before this Court. As
Justice Holmes said, "[laws frequently are enforced which the
court recognizes as possibly or probably invalid if attacked by a
different interest or in a different way." Quong Wing v.
Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 64 (1912). 1"
Third, the District Court's assertion that "intent to use" in
clause 5 means intent to use for "substantial economic benefit" is
erroneous. See Mem. Op. 39 (App. 63), 842 F. Supp. at 559. The
District Court correctly recognized that "intent to use" standing
alone is too broad to serve as the mens rea element. Images of
currency may be "used" as kindling for fire; they may be mounted
in frames and "used" in museums for the pleasure of the viewing
public; they may be "used" as props in movies. None of those
activities is a felony. As the District Court itself recognized, "intent
to use" must mean something narrower under this statute-just as
it does under 18 U.S.C. § 495. But the District Court's narrowing
interpretation-intent to use for "substantial economic benefit"-
breaks down even on cursory scrutiny. Consider application of the
statute thus interpreted to a hypothetical newspaper publisher: if she
prints a Boggs Bill in a story about this case, selling her newspa-
pers for money, she has "used" an image of currency for pecuniary
gain and can be imprisoned for 12 years; but if she anonymously
lends a Boggs Bill to a local museum and attends an exhibit there,
she has "used" it-but not for pecuniary gain-and would not be
subject to criminal prosecution.
Once the court makes a narrowing interpretation of "intent to
use," it should construe the phrase to mean what had been express
in every earlier version of the statutory language: "intent to use...
in forging or counterfeiting."' 6  Well-settled canons of statutory
"s Accord UnitedStates v. L.A. Tucker TruckLines, 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952);
United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 172 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.).
16 Ch. 44, § 19, 14th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 Stat. 266, 275 (Apr. 10, 1816)
(Addendum Tab 1); ch. 2, § 11, 25th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 Stat. 201, 203 (Oct. 12,
1837); ch. 5, § 10, 29th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 Stat. 118, 120 (Jan. 28, 1847); ch. 1,
§ 13, 35th Cong., 2d Sess., 11 Stat. 257, 259 (Dec. 23, 1857); ch. 1, § 13, 36th
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construction require this interpretation: the statute's intent element
must be construed in light of the common-law understanding (see
supra pp. 21-25); the statute must be construed to avoid a constitu-
tionally suspect interpretation (see infra pp. 33-34); and Congress
must not be presumed to intend to change the meaning of a statute
in a reenactment without clear evidence that it so intends (see infra
pp. 32-33 n.30). For these reasons, this Court and others have
consistently held a similar intent element in 18 U.S.C. § 495 to
require not just some level of intent, but an intent to defraud. See
supra p. 22 & n. 5. The District Court offered no reason why
section 474 is any different.
Finally, the severe penalty is very strong evidence that
Congress intended to incorporate the common-law mens rea
element into the crime. X-Citement, 115 S. Ct. at 468; Staples, 114
S. Ct. at 1802. For the first 120 years of its existence, this statute
carried a fifteen-year maximum term of imprisonment.' 7 Today,
the penalty is twelve years. That, too, strongly supports an
interpretation of section 474 as requiring an intent to defraud. And
the District Court ignored that, too.
4. The Legislative History Supports An Intent-To-
Defraud Element In Section 474
The rule outlined above gives way (apart from constitutional
prohibitions) if Congress "plainly and unmistakably"' 8 intends a
contrary result as evidenced by an "affirmative instruction."
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 273. But neither the text of the statute nor
its legislative history reveals an instruction to dispense with the
common-law scienter requirement. The evidence points in the
opposite direction: those involved in the drafting, passage, and
administration of this legislation all expressed the view that it was
Cong., 2d Sess., 12 Stat. 121, 123 (Dec. 17, 1860).
17 See Ch. 33, § 7, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 Stat. 345, 347-48 (Feb. 25,
1862) (Addendum Tab 3); 18 U.S.C. § 474 (1988). In October 1992, Congress
changed the penalty by making the crime a "class C felony," which carries a
term of imprisonment of up to twelve years (18 U.S.C. § 3581(b)(3) (1988)).
"S United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (quoting United States
v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917)).
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directed against "counterfeiting." As we have shown (see supra
pp. 23-25), to "counterfeit" was understood in legal usage to
involve behavior undertaken wrongfully and with a view to
defraud. Ordinary usage was in accord.' 9 A radical departure from
the common-law understanding of what was required for conviction
did not seem to be on anyone's mind.
Section 474's oldest direct forebear was a provision in the
controversial legal-tender legislation, which was enacted by the
Thirty-Seventh Congress in 1862 to borrow funds needed to fight
the Civil War.20 As introduced, and as first reported by the
Committee of Ways and Means, the bill had no penal provision at
all. 2' Treasury Secretary (later Chief Justice) Salmon P. Chase
'9 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 274
(Chauncey A. Goodrich ed.) (Springfield, George & Charles Merriam 1852)
(Addendum Tab 27) (defining "counterfeit" as "[t]o forge; to copy or imitate,
without authority or right, and with a view to deceive or defraud, by passing the
copy or thing forged for that which is original or genuine; as, to counterfeit coin,
banknotes, a seal, a bond, a deed, or other instrument in writing, the handwriting
or signature of another, &c. To make a likeness or resemblance of any thing with
a view to defraud"); Joseph E. Worcester, A Dictionary of the English Language
324 (Boston, Hickling, Swan & Brewer 1860) (Addendum Tab 28) (defining
"counterfeit" as "[t]o copy with an intent to pass the copy for an original; to
imitate wrongfully; to forge; to feign; as, 'To counterfeit a bank-note."').
Indeed, to "counterfeit" has meant to "imitate (with intent to deceive)" and
"[t]o make a fraudulent imitation of' since at least the Fourteenth Century and
probably since the Norman invasion. See III Oxford English Dictionary 1027 (2d
ed. 1989). Today, to counterfeit still means to copy or imitate "with a view to
deceive or defraud," Black's Law Dictionary 349 (6th ed. 1990); Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 519 (1986) ("copy with intent to deceive"); 1
Leonard B. Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions: Criminal Instruction
21-3 (1993) ("Counterfeiting in its broadest sense means the making of a copy
without authority or right and with the purpose of deceiving or defrauding by
passing the copy as original or genuine.").
20 Ch. 33, § 7, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 Stat. 345, 347-48 (Feb. 25, 1862)
(Addendum Tab 3); see Elbridge G. Spaulding, History of the Legal Tender
Paper Money IssuedDuring the Great Rebellion 14-17 (Buffalo, Express Printing
Co. 1869) (Addendum Tab 7) [hereinafter"Spaulding"]. Portions of the statutory
language at issue here date to 1816. See supra p. 28 n.16; Addendum Tab 1.
21 H.R. 182 (Dec. 30, 1861) (Addendum Tab 8); H.R. 187 (Jan. 7, 1862)
(Addendum Tab 9); H.R. 240 (Jan. 22, 1862) (Addendum Tab 10); Spaulding,
supra, at 14-17 (Addendum Tab 7).
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reviewed the bill and suggested "that it would be necessary to have
one or more penal sections to guard against counterfeiting."22 He
therefore submitted a provision "to punish counterfeiting and other
fraudulent practices," adding that the "section in relation to counter-
feiting explains itself."23 This became section 6 of the act, which
eventually became 18 U.S.C. §§ 471 and 472.
On February 3, 1862, Secretary Chase proposed to the Commit-
tee on Ways and Means that the bill include two penal sections
relating to counterfeiting, instead of one. He did so, he wrote,
"[t]hinking of the danger of counterfeits of the United States Notes
and other securities., 24 This second penal section would become
section 7 of the statute and, ultimately, 18 U.S.C. § 474. The
sponsor of the legislation, Representative Elbridge G. Spaulding,
agreed with Secretary Chase that both provisions (sections 6 and 7)
would "guard against counterfeiting.,
25
A year after passage of the statute, the Thirty-Seventh Congress
extended its provisions to cover additional federal obligations "in
order to prevent and punish counterfeiting and fraudulent alterations
of the bonds, notes, and fractional currency.' '26 This statement-
in the text of a statute enacted by the same Congress as the one that
enacted the direct progenitor of modem section 474-may be the
most authoritative statement of that Congress' intent: "to prevent
and punish counterfeiting and fraud[]."
22 Spaulding, supra, at 26 (Addendum Tab 7).
23 Letter from Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, to Thaddeus
Stevens, Chairman, House Committee of Ways and Means (Jan. 29, 1862) (in the
National Archives) (Addendum Tab 13).
24 Letter from Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, to Thaddeus
Stevens, Chairman, House Committee of Ways and Means (Feb. 3, 1862) (in the
National Archives) (Addendum Tab 14).
2 Spaulding, supra, at 98 (Addendum Tab 7). The Senate made minor
verbal changes in the counterfeiting provisions, Cong. Globe 773 (Feb. 12, 1862)
(Addendum Tab 12), which the House agreed to without recorded debate on the
counterfeiting question. Cong. Globe 902 (Feb. 20, 1862) (Addendum Tab 12).
A conference committee resolved discrepancies between the House and Senate
versions, and President Lincoln signed the bill on February 25, 1862. See Cong.
Globe 976 (Feb. 26, 1862), 994 (Feb. 27, 1862) (Addendum Tab 12).
26 Ch. 73, § 8, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., 12 Stat. 709, 713 (March 3, 1863)
(Addendum Tab 5).
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The Thirty-Eighth Congress enacted a substantially identical
provision.17 This time, the House Ways and Means Committee
reported the bill with the anti-counterfeiting provision already in
place.2" So far as we have found, this reenactment of the 1862
provision was not the subject of correspondence among the prin-
cipal historical figures, any testimony before or report by any
committee of Congress, any substantive amendment by the House
or Senate, or any significant floor debate. 29 Thus, Congress must
be presumed to have intended no substantive change.3 °
Finally, the recorded views of the agency charged with
implementing the legislation in the era of its passage also indicate
a concern only with "counterfeiting." In 1877, the Solicitor of the
Treasury characterized the provision as one "which guards the
issuing of counterfeits of paper money by punishing severely any
person having in possession a plate engraved in counterfeit or
217 Ch. 172, § 11, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 Stat. 218, 222 (June 30, 1864)
(Addendum Tab 15).
28 H.R. 540, § 11 (June 20, 1864) (Addendum Tab 17).
29 See Note on Sources at the head of Appellant's Legislative History
Addendum. The only allusion to the provision that we have found in the course
of the debates came when the House adopted an amendment clarifying that the
courts have discretion in the imposition of penalties upon conviction. Cong.
Globe 3,209 (June 22, 1864) (Addendum Tab 18).
With minor changes in phraseology, this section was reenacted in 1874
as section 5430 of the Revised Statutes (Addendum Tab 20), and then recodified
in 1909, as section 150 of the first revision of the Criminal Code. Ch. 321,
§ 150, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 35 Stat. 1088, 1116 (Mar. 4, 1909) (Addendum Tab
23). According to the revising commission, section 150 did not involve any
substantive change. S. Rep. No. 10, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 14, 19 (Jan.
7, 1908) (Addendum Tab 24). Section 150 was redesignated-again with only
minor changes in phraseology-as section 474 of the criminal code in the 1946
recodification, ch. 645, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 62 Stat. 683, 706 (June 25, 1948),
where it remains today. 18 U.S.C. § 474 (Supp. V 1993).
30 Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 318
(1985); Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 467-74 (1975); Fourco Glass Co. v.
Transmirra Products, 353 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1957); Anderson v. Pacific Coast
S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187, 199 (1912); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 302
(1892); United States v. LeBris, 121 U.S. 278, 280 (1887); United States v.
Ryder, 110 U.S. 729, 740 (1884); McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U.S. 619, 628-29
(1884); Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 502 (1870).
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similitude of any note issued by the United States."31  A year
later, the new Secretary of the Treasury, John Sherman (who had
been the bill's principal supporter in the Senate), "fully concur[red]
in the opinion of the Solicitor."3
5. The Doctrine Of Avoiding Constitutional Questions
Requires The Inclusion Of The Common-Law Scienter
Element
What we have said thus far provides a non-constitutional basis
for reversal grounded in a rule that has been settled for generations.
Another such rule must be applied as well: a statute must be
construed, where fairly possible, so as to avoid substantial constitu-
tional questions unless "such construction is plainly contrary to the
intent of Congress."33 The District Court did not even acknowl-
edge this principle in its opinion. But it applies with particular
force to statutes that raise First Amendment concerns. Especially in
such cases, the courts go to great lengths to interpret statutes to
avoid deciding questions as to their constitutionality. See, e.g.,
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464, 467-68
(1994) (rejecting "most natural grammatical reading" of statute);
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483, 492 n.3 (1988) (adopting
"rather strained" reading of statute); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
3' Letter from George F. Talbot, Solicitor of the Treasury, to Lot M. Morrill,
Secretary of the Treasury (Jan. 15, 1877),printed in S. Ex. Doc. 19, 44th Cong.,
2d Sess. (Jan. 17, 1877) (Addendum Tab 21); accord Letter from Lot Morrill,
Secretary of the Treasury, to John Sherman, Chairman, Senate Committee on
Finance (Jan. 15, 1877), printed in S. Ex. Doc. 19, 44th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Addendum Tab 21).
32 Letter from John Sherman, Secretary of the Treasury, to W.A. Wheeler,
President Pro Tern of the Senate (Jan. 16, 1878), printed in S. Ex. Doc. No. 10,
45th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 17, 1878) (Addendum Tab 22); see generally 1 John
Sherman, Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate and Cabinet 268-83
(New York, The Werner Co. 1895) (Addendum Tab 6). For a discussion of
Sherman's role in the passage of the act, see Frederick J. Blue, Salmon P. Chase:
A Life in Politics 151-52 (1987).
33 EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); see Public Citizen v. Department of Justice,
491 U.S. 440, 465-66 (1989) (collecting cases).
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U.S. 296, 311 (1940). This case follows a fortiori from those,
because non-constitutional rules of statutory construction require an
interpretation of the statute as containing a scienter element in any
event. See, e.g., X-Citement, 115 S.Ct. at 467-68. We discuss below
the three independent reasons why the statute is unconstitutional.
But the Court need not reach those issues if it interprets that statute
to include the scienter element required at common law.
B. Prosecution Of Boggs Would Be Unconstitutional
1. The First Amendment Forbids A Strict-Liability
Felony Here
Strict-liability criminal statutes "cannot be applied in settings
where they have the collateral effect of inhibiting the freedom of
expression, by making the individual the more reluctant to exercise
it." Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). The Supreme
Court recently reaffirmed this doctrine, holding that "'criminal
responsibility may not be imposed without some element of scienter
on the part of the defendant."' X-Citement, 115 S. Ct. at 472
(quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982), and citing
Smith). Smith and X-Citement articulate the principle that the
Government may not burden speech by punishing expression that
is "honestly made." New York 7-mes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 278-80 (1964) (relying on Smith to impose requirement of
"actual malice" on libel plaintiffs); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) ("[A] rule that would impose strict liability
on a publisher for [unprotected expression] would have an
undoubted 'chilling' effect on speech.").
The safe harbor set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 504 has no bearing on
this principle. As the Court explained in X-Citement, First Amend-
ment constraints provide the public with "settled expectations that
the contents of magazines and film are generally [not] subject to
stringent [strict-liability] regulation." 115 S. Ct. at 468-69.
Publishers-who assume that they have the full panoply of First
Amendment protections-use the image of money with great
frequency without satisfying the size and color limitations. The
image of money is not limited to the nefarious world of the
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counterfeiter. It is commonplace. The record contains examples
contemporaneous with the filing of the Complaint. App. C to Pl.'s
Mem. in Support of Mot. for TRO (Sept. 3, 1993) (App. 77-83).
And in mainstream magazines published during a recent six-month
period, we found dozens of images of money that did not satisfy
the size and color provisions of section 504. See Addendum A at
1 a-3a. Under the District Court's opinion, these publishers-and the
millions of people who bought copies of the magazines in question
(id at 4a)-are all subject to criminal felony prosecution. But
under Smith and its progeny, they have committed no crime.
This Supreme Court precedent is clear, unequivocal, and
controlling. The District Court simply ignored it. That warrants
reversal.
2. Section 504 Does Not Bear A "Real Nexus" To The
Government's Goals
If this Court does not interpret section 474 as carrying the
common-law scienter element, it must also confront the facial
unconstitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 504. The District Court held that
section 504's safe-harbor exemption from criminal liability (for
black-and-white illustrations that satisfy certain size limitations)
saves section 474's seemingly limitless prohibition on speech from
constitutional infirmity. Following a concurring opinion in Regan
v. ime, Inc., the District Court held that sections 474 and 504,
when read "in tandem," are reasonable restrictions on speech. But
even statutes furthering a legitimate government interest must be
narrowly tailored to serve the interest.34 As this Court explained
in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Kerrigan, 865 F.2d 382
(D.C. Cir. 1989):
" See, e.g., United States v. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1014-18 (1995)
(striking down statute chilling speech of federal employees because government
failed to show nexus between statute and government interest to be served);
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd, 502 U.S. 105, 122
n.** (1991) (striking down statute not narrowly tailored to promote admittedly
"compelling" government interest); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980) (striking down ordinance that only
"peripherally" promoted admittedly "substantial" government interest).
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[T]he "narrowly tailored" portion of the time, place or
manner test requires that there be a real nexus between the
challenged regulation and the significant governmental
interest sought to be served by the regulation. If the
regulation does not meaningfully advance the interest, the
regulation cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny if it
restricts free expression in a public forum.
865 F.2d at 388 (emphasis by the Court). A regulation is not
narrowly tailored where "a substantial portion of the burden on
speech does not serve to advance [the Government's legitimate]
goals." Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 122 n.** (internal quotation
omitted). Although a party challenging an act of Congress as
unconstitutional ordinarily bears a heavy burden, the opposite is
true in First Amendment cases, where the Government bears the
burden of establishing the "real nexus."35
Defendants offered no evidence to meet that burden. That is
fatal to their case. The statute cannot stand without evidence from
the Government: "it is the government's case to prove and it has
failed to do so." United States v. Doe, 968 F.2d 86, 91 (D.C. Cir.
1992). In recently striking down a federal statute, the Supreme
Court repeated Justice Brandeis' famous prescription that even a
"'reasonable' burden on expression requires a justification far
stronger than mere speculation about serious harms. 'Fear of
serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and
assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women."' NTEU, 115 S.
Ct. at 1017 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376
(1927) (concurring opinion)).
31 Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980);
United States v. Doe, 968 F.2d 86, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362
(1976); see also Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989)
("'Deference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First
Amendment rights are at stake."') (quoting Landmark Communications v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978)); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) ("In the context of governmental restriction of speech,
it has long been established that the government cannot limit speech protected
by the First Amendment without bearing the burden of showing that its
restriction is justified.").
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a. The District Court Applied The Wong Legal
Standard
Apparently recognizing that the Government had not satisfied
the "real nexus" standard, the District Court applied a different one.
It held: "[a]fter reviewing the government's evidence as to a real
nexus, this court agrees with Justice Stevens that. . . 'the color and
size requirements are permissible methods of minimizing the risk
of fraud as well as counterfeiting."' Mem. Op. 32 (App. 56), 842
F. Supp. at 556 (quoting Regan v. ime, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 704
(1984)). Regan-a case in which Time, Inc. challenged the
constitutionality of the size and color provisions of section 504-
produced four opinions, none of which garnered a majority. Justice
Stevens wrote only for himself, articulating a radical departure
from traditional First Amendment doctrine by proposing a
balancing test-never adopted by any court prior to this case, so far
as we are aware-requiring a sliding-scale analysis to evaluate
blanket restrictions on speech: "a statute which implicates a
particularly strong governmental interest need not serve that interest
to the same degree to withstand constitutional scrutiny as it would
if the interest were weaker." 468 U.S. at 696. Thus, Justice
Stevens appears to have concluded that the size and color restric-
tions are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest, but that-in his view-it should not matter. That view was
shared by the District Judge,36 but it is not the law.
b. The Size And Color Limitations Are Obsolete
Viewed under the proper legal standard, the statute cannot
stand. The unrebutted evidence in the record demonstrates that the
size and color limitations are no longer narrowly tailored to serve
the goals of preventing counterfeiting and fraud. In 1984, the
plurality in Regan deferred to the Government's assertion that
negatives and four-color separations of images of currency were
36 Motions Hearing Tr. 36, 51-52 (App. 224, 239-40); Mem. Op. 32 (App.
56), 842 F. Supp. at 556.
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(1) critical for the effective counterfeiter in the early 1980s, and (2)
difficult to come by, so that allowing them to fall into the wrong
hands could have had dangerous consequences. Therefore, four
Justices opined that the size and color limitations were facially
valid, on the theory that they served the goal of making it "harder
for counterfeiters to gain access to negatives that could easily be
altered and used for counterfeiting purposes." Regan, 468 U.S. at
657.
Today, alterations in size and color are no obstacle at all to the
would-be counterfeiter: enlarging or reducing an image or changing
its color takes only a few keystrokes. Michael Bittman, who has
spent his entire adult life in the printing business, explained that
widely available computer equipment
is designed to allow the user to change the size and color
of the images before outputting them to a printing device,
so it would make no difference for a person up to no good
whether he started with a genuine bill or a copy of one in
black-and-white of a different size than genuine currency;
either way, the technology that has now become widely
available could be misused.
Bittman Decl. 8 (App. 262). This undisputed common-sense
statement confirms what the Secret Service itself has told Congress:
The development of new technology ... has provided
counterfeiters with new methods of duplicating currency
and other securities. The introduction of multi-colored
copiers, hi-tech computers, and laser scanners/printers
(electro optical scanners) has made counterfeiting a crime
of opportunity for those with access to such equipment.
3 7
The Treasury Department has also conceded that the size and
color limitations do not effectively serve the governmental interest
at issue-preventing counterfeiting. The Director of the Bureau of
Engraving and Printing, which designs and produces United States
currency, has testified before Congress that the difficulty of
37 US. Mint Authorization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Affairs & Coinage of the House Comm. on Banking, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 50
(Apr. 23, 1991) (hereinafter "1991 Hearing") (Testimony of William J. Ebert,
Special Agent in Charge, Counterfeit Division, United States Secret Service).
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reproducing "color [is] an ineffective deterrent against today's high
quality color copiers and computer scanners,"3 and that new,
narrowly tailored anti-counterfeiting measures "best respond to the
threat" of counterfeiting.39 Surely these new measures are compel-
ling evidence that the size and color restrictions are no longer an
effective means for accomplishing the goal of preventing counter-
feiting.
Congress has itself recognized that section 504 is no longer
narrowly tailored to prevent counterfeiting and has therefore
directed the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations
that "permit color illustrations" and to "establish a system to ensure
that the legitimate use of ... electronic methods and retention
of. . . reproductions [of currency] by businesses, hobbyists, press
or others shall not be unduly restricted." Pub. L. 102-550, Title
XV, § 1554, 106 Stat. 3672, 4071 (1992) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 504(1)(D) & (2) (Supp. V 1993)). The regulations have not been
promulgated.
The statute as interpreted below appears to cover a wide variety
of speech that bears no risk of promoting counterfeiting or fraud.
At least 85 million copies of popular magazines containing apparent
"violations" were published in one recent six-month period.
Addendum A at 1 a-4a. The First Amendment requires a closer fit
than this statute provides. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 122 n.**.
3. Sections 474 And 504 Are Unconstitutional As
Applied To Boggs
The Government may not "suppress[] expression out of concern
for its likely communicative impact," even if the statute is facially
neutral. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317 (1990) (flag
burning). But that is what the Secret Service has done. The Secret
3' Redesign of the Currency: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (July 13, 1994) (Prepared Statement of Peter H. Daly,
Director, Bureau of Engraving and Printing).
39 1991 Hearing at 47 (Prepared Statement of Peter H. Daly, Director,
Bureau of Engraving and Printing); see generally Robert E. Schafrik & Sara E.
Church, "Protecting the Greenback," Scientific American, July 1995 at 40-46
(describing project to redesign currency).
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Service has applied the statutory scheme to Boggs because law-
enforcement officers disapprove of the content of his work.
The Secret Service has seized Boggs' work en masse-with no
pre- or post-deprivation adversary hearing of any kind-and has
engaged in extrajudicial efforts at censorship. See supra pp. 8-10.
Secret Service agents have also taken outrageous "enforcement"
positions. One agent actually took the position that one of Boggs'
black-on-canvas paintings that met the size restrictions was a
"violation" because canvas is not "white" but "off-white." Boggs
Aff. 14; Boggs Decl. 6 (App. 116, 257).
In an earlier case, Defendants articulated their policy position
quite explicitly: sections 474 and 504 assist in "preserving the
integrity" of some sort of governmental "property" interest in the
"design and appearance" of currency. Brief for Appellants in Regan
v. 7ime, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984) (No. 82-729) at 14. Another
Treasury official recently condemned activities that would "defame
the intrinsic value" of currency.40 "After all," the Treasury official
said, "this is the currency of the United States of America, and that
stands for something." Id.
Viewed in light of these policy statements, Defendants' radical
enforcement positions and insistence on freedom from judicial
supervision raise an inference of content-based disapproval of
Boggs' work-an inference to which Boggs is entitled on review
of a grant of summary judgment against him. The District Court
seems to have missed this point. It believed that it could only
decide an overbreadth challenge and found the statute facially
neutral. Mem. Op. 29 n.31 (App. 53), 842 F. Supp. at 555. But "a
statute, even if not void on its face, may be challenged because [it
is] invalid as applied." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
This content-based restriction is particularly egregious as
applied to Boggs, because he is hamstrung by section 504's size
and color restrictions. Boggs Aff. 9; Chambers Decl. 12; Mayer
Decl. 8 (App. 114-15, 175-76, 180). Regulation of the size and
color of a work of art is regulation of its content. Imagine a
40 See Calvin Sims, "In Recycling of Greenbacks, New Meaning for Old
Money," New York Times, May 22, 1994, at 1, 26.
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
government directive to Pablo Picasso to make Guernica smaller,
to diminish its impact; or a directive to Jasper Johns not to use the
image of the American Flag in its actual colors, to "preserve" the
flag's "integrity." A blanket prohibition on a form of speech is
unconstitutional in any event (see, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114
S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (1994) (collecting cases)), but appears particular-
ly misplaced here. With advances in modem technology, only a
fool would attempt to use Boggs' art as a template for counterfeit-
ing; real currency would do the job far more effectively.
C. The Government Cannot Satisfy The Similitude
Requirement
1. The Art In The Record Is Not "Calculated To
Deceive"
The courts have long excluded from the reach of the counter-
feiting laws those items that do not bear "such a likeness or a
resemblance to a genuine obligation ... as is calculated to deceive
an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation
and care dealing with a person supposed to be honest and up-
right."'4 As one court observed after reviewing cases dating back
more than a century, "[t]he similitude jury charge has received
general acceptance in § 474 prosecutions." United States v. Hall,
801 F.2d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 1986).
On the Government's motion for summary judgment, the
District Court was required to view all of the art in the record with
every reasonable inference drawn in Boggs' favor, but it still found
that a jury, conscientiously following instructions requiring proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, would be "justified, if not compelled"
41 United States v. Ross, 844 F.2d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 1988) (internal
quotations omitted); see United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Hall, 801 F.2d 356, 357-58 (8th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Lustig,
159 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1947), rev'don other grounds, 338 U.S. 74 (1949);
United States v. Williams, 14 F. 550, 551 (E.D. Wis. 1882); 2 Edward J. Devitt,
et al., Federal Jury Practice & Instructions § 29.12 (4th ed. 1990); cf United
States v. Gomes, 969 F.2d 1290, 1293 (1st Cir. 1992).
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in concluding that the art in the record is so similar to United
States currency that it "is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible
and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care dealing
with a person supposed to be upright and honest." Mem. Op. 43
(App. 67), 842 F. Supp. at 561 (emphasis supplied).
We respectfully submit that this finding stands as a third,
independent reason for reversal, because it cannot be squared with
the evidence. Surely no reasonable juror could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the work of art reproduced at page 2 of this
Brief is calculated to deceive anyone. At oral argument (or prior to
it if the panel wishes) we shall have available for the panel's
review the portfolio of works of art that we submitted to the
District Court as Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Hearing Exhibit 1.
As the Court will see, these works of art "have the general pattern
of general currency" (Mem. Op. 44 (App. 68), 842 F. Supp. at
561), but they are not counterfeit. The counterfeiter's work is
calculated to deceive; Boggs' work is calculated to illuminate.
Accordingly, Boggs' work does not have the overall "look" and
"feel" of genuine currency, even at first glance. On closer examina-
tion, the viewer discovers even more distinctions: Boggs' work
bears his own signature and contain unique features distinguishing
it from the genuine article. In sum, no reasonable juror could
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that these works are "calculat-
ed to deceive" (that is, designed for the purpose of deception).
2. Clause 6 Contains The Similitude Requirement
Although the District Court purported to evaluate the works of
art in the record under the "similitude" test, it alternatively held
that the Government did not have to meet this rigorous standard for
a prosecution under clause 6 of section 474, because clause 6 in its
current form uses only the word "likeness." Mem. Op. 44 (App.
68), 842 F. Supp. at 560-61. We submit that the similitude
requirement applies with equal force in prosecutions under clause
6 for two separate reasons.
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First, in both the 1862 and 1864 versions of the statute, clause
6 used the phrase "likeness or similitude." 42 During that period,
as today, the two words were defined in terms of each other.43
There is every reason, therefore, to believe that Congress intended
the use of the word "or" in the phrase "likeness or similitude" to
be understood in the sense of a synonymous expression.44 See
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 114 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (1994).
Not until the 1874 codification (Addendum Tab 20) did Congress
omit the word "similitude" from the provision as a change in
phraseology, presumably to eliminate this redundancy. Effecting a
radical departure from the prior statute through so subtle a change
would appear counter to, rather than consistent with, the goals of
a general revision and comprehensive codification. For that reason,
the presumption has been to the contrary for more than a century.
See supra pp. 32-33 n.30.
Second, the similitude requirement has become an accepted
landmark in counterfeiting prosecutions. See supra p. 43. To
impose criminal liability under some lesser (but still unarticulated)
standard, on the theory that one provision of a counterfeiting statute
does not carry the requirement that all of the rest do, would hardly
square with the accepted principle that a criminal statute constitutes
a clear and fair warning that society-and Congress-has unequivo-
cally imposed its moral condemnation on the behavior in question.
42 Ch. 33, § 7, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 Stat. 345, 347 (Addendum Tab 3);
ch. 172, § 11, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 Stat. 218, 222 (Addendum Tab 15).
43 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 666,
1032 (Chauncey A. Goodrich ed.) (Springfield, George & Charles Merriam 1852)
(Addendum Tab 27); Joseph E. Worcester, A Dictionary of the English Language
840, 1341 (Boston, Hickling, Swan & Brewer 1860) (Addendum Tab 28). Roget
classified both words in his entry on "Partial relation." Peter Mark Roget,
Thesaurus of English Words 47 (Barnas Sears ed.) (Boston, Gould & Lincoln
1854) (Addendum Tab 29).
Today, the words "likeness" and "similitude" are still defined by reference
to each other. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1310, 2120-21
(1986); Roget's International Thesaurus, § 783.3 at 549 (5th ed. 1992).
44 "Or is often used to express an alternative of terms, definitions, or
explanations of the same thing in different words." Webster, An American
Dictionary 775-76 (Addendum Tab 27).
BOGGS v. BOWRON
See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990); United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment in favor of
the Government should be reversed. The case should be remanded
for: (1) entry of an injunction forbidding further harassment of
Boggs or intimidation of his customers and dealers; (2) entry of an
injunction forbidding prosecution of Boggs; and (3) further
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